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and NAFTA Binational Review of U.S.
Agency Decisions from 1989 to 2005
Juscelino F. Colares*
When the United States and Canada agreed to replace U.S. judicial review
of trade remedy cases with a new dispute mechanism under Chapter 19 of
the Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement (now the North American Free
Trade Agreement), the U.S. Congress and trade negotiators stipulated that
the new dispute settlement panels would apply the U.S. law and standard of
review in the same manner as U.S. courts. This requirement was embodied
in the text of the agreement and has at least nominally been applied by
Chapter 19 panels ever since. Empirical analysis of 17 years of decisions now
allows a conclusion with a high degree of confidence that Chapter 19 panels
are far more likely than U.S. courts to overturn U.S. agency decisions. Not
only that, but Chapter 19 panels have produced outcomes more favorable to
Canadian importers than have U.S. courts. This outcome illustrates that the
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facial legal terms of an international agreement may give a misleading
impression of how it will actually be implemented, and suggests that greater
attention must be paid to how it will be interpreted and by whom.

I. Introduction
Quantitative analysis on the economic effects and trends of trade liberalization has been both frequent and sophisticated. Vast quantities of easily
accessible aggregate data, including multiple countries’ trade volumes,
average tariff levels, and gross domestic product, are available to economists
from governmental or private sources. Perhaps due to the difficulty in
obtaining quantitative data on legal phenomena related to the operation of
the different international trade regimes, legal scholarship has scarcely used
statistical analysis. This means that we have come to understand a good deal
about the broad quantifiable economic consequences of trade agreements,
but remain largely confined to anecdotal accounts of how such agreements
have affected and been impacted by the legal proceedings taking place in the
domestic and international legal infrastructure.1 Thus, studying what can be
quantified in the operation of this legal architecture is critical for an understanding of how international trade law has evolved as it has been applied by
the institutions charged with adjudicating international trade disputes. This
effort may also contribute to a more complete comprehension of the processes underlying economic change.
The United States, like Canada and nearly every other industrialized
nation, maintains “trade remedy” laws that authorize U.S. administrative
agencies to impose duties on imported goods they find to be “dumped” or
subsidized. These anti-dumping (AD) and countervailing duty (CVD) determinations are subject to review by U.S. federal courts. Chapter 19 of the
Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement (CUSFTA) and its successor,2 the North
American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), allowed replacing review of

1

For one such brilliant anecdotal study, see Daniel K. Tarullo, The Hidden Costs of International Dispute Settlement: WTO Review of Domestic Anti-Dumping Decisions, 34 Law & Pol’y
Int’l Bus. 109, 110 (2002).

2

Technically speaking, NAFTA did not terminate CUSFTA, which remains in operation, as
specified in North American Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-Can.-Mex., Art. 103(1), Dec. 17, 1992,
32 I.L.M. 289, 297 (1993) [hereinafter NAFTA]. CUSFTA provisions that are inconsistent with
NAFTA are no longer in effect. Id., Art. 103(2), 32 I.L.M. at 297.
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agency decisions by national judges on trade remedy cases with review by
binational panels appointed jointly by the governments involved.3 Chapter
19 requires these binational panels to review agency decisions on AD and
CVD law using the same standard of review and substantive law as would the
domestic courts they replace.4 NAFTA also prohibits domestic judicial review
once one of the members requests the formation of a panel, and requires
members to obey the decisions of these panels.5 The U.S. and Canadian
governments adopted this arrangement as a compromise after the United
States rejected Canada’s demands that CUSFTA eliminate all anti-dumping
and countervailing duties in trade between the two countries.6 Canadians
reasoned that this new mechanism for review of agency decisions would put
a check on what they perceived as a predisposition on the part of U.S.
agencies to rule in favor of U.S. industry petitioners.7
Prior studies of Chapter 19 agree that these panels overturn U.S.
agency decisions more often than U.S. judges. Yet, none of these studies has
provided an actual empirical comparison of how review has been different
under these two systems. This article reviews prior research and extends it by
comparing the results of review of U.S. agency determinations with Chapter
19 review.

II. Operation of U.S. Trade Remedy Law
The AD and CVD law in the United States is a complex set of statutes
designed to ensure that the executive branch takes action against unfair

3

See Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-Can., Art. 1904, Jan. 2, 1988, 27 I.L.M. 281, 387;
NAFTA, supra note 2, Art. 1904, 32 I.L.M. at 683.

4

See CUSFTA, supra note 3, Art. 1904(3), 27 I.L.M. at 387; NAFTA, supra note 2, Art. 1904(3),
32 I.L.M. at 683.

5

See CUSFTA, supra note 3, Art. 1904(1), 27 I.L.M. at 387; NAFTA, supra note 2, Art. 1904(1),
32 I.L.M. at 683.

6

Michael Hart, Dumping and Free Trade Areas, in Antidumping Law and Practice 326, 336–41
(John H. Jackson & Edwin A. Vermulst eds., 1989).

7

U.S. General Accounting Office, GAO/GGD-95-175BR, U.S.-Canada Free Trade Agreement:
Factors Contributing to Controversy in Appeals of Trade Remedy Cases to Binational Panels 3
(1995) [hereinafter GAO Report].
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trade practices by foreign countries and/or foreign companies trading with
the United States. Usually, a U.S. manufacturer files a petition with the U.S.
Department of Commerce (Commerce).8 The petition must claim that
imports from another country have benefited from government subsidies or
are being sold in the United States at prices lower than in their home market
(dumping).9 After a brief preliminary inquiry into sufficiency of the petition,
Commerce then conducts an investigation to determine if the petitioner’s
claims are valid.10 Concurrently, the U.S. International Trade Commission
(ITC) investigates whether the U.S. domestic industry has suffered injury by
reason of such imports.11 If both agencies make affirmative determinations,
then Commerce calculates an offsetting duty that will be applied against the
subject import.12
Agency determinations can be reviewed only by the U.S. Court of
International Trade (CIT), an Article III court sitting in New York City.13 The
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (CAFC) has exclusive appellate
jurisdiction over final decisions of the CIT.14 The U.S. Supreme Court has
discretion to review CAFC decisions,15 though it has reviewed only a handful
of AD and CVD cases in the last 100 years.16
Review of U.S. agency final determinations occurs under the “substantial evidence” standard. Under this standard, the reviewing court decides
whether such determinations are “unsupported by substantial evidence on
the record, or otherwise not in accordance with law.”17 Specifically, this

8

19 U.S.C. §§ 1671a(b) (CVD), 1673a(b) (AD) (2006).

9

Id.

10

19 U.S.C. §§ 1671a(c), 1673a(c).

11

19 U.S.C. §§ 1671d(b) (CVD), 1673d(b) (AD).

12

19 U.S.C. §§ 1671d(c) (CVD),1673d(c) (AD).

13

See 28 U.S.C. § 1581 (2006).

14

28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(5).

15

28 U.S.C. § 1254.

16

The last case the Court reviewed was Zenith Radio Corp. v. United States, 437 U.S. 443 (1978).

17

19 U.S.C. § 1516a(b)(1)(B)(i).
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standard has been interpreted to be the equivalent of asking: Is the determination unreasonable?18 In the majority of cases, when deciding whether
an agency’s decision is “not in accordance with law,” a court will provide
some deference to the agency’s legal interpretations, upholding them unless
they are “effectively precluded by the statute.”19
This review process is open to all foreign parties who wish to appeal
U.S. agency determinations before U.S. courts; however, NAFTA member
countries have another option in Chapter 19 panel review.

III. The Chapter 19 Review System
Chapter 19 came into effect on January 1, 1989.20 It was in part a result of a
compromise between Canada—which had wanted complete exemption
from U.S. AD law21—and the United States—which was not ready to do so
unless Canada agreed to a stricter set of rules against subsidies.22 This
arrangement, a product of last-minute negotiations,23 enabled the two
trading partners to enter what they perceived as a mutually advantageous
agreement. At the time, the United States and Canada had the largest
bilateral trade relationship in the world.24 The United States was Canada’s
largest export market and Canada was the United States’ second largest

18
Nippon Steel Corp. v. United States, Nos. 05-1404 & 05-1417, slip op. at 9 (Fed. Cir. Aug. 10,
2006) (internal punctuation omitted) (quoting SSIH Equip. SA v. United States Int’l Trade
Comm’n, 718 F.2d 365, 381 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (Nies, J., concurring)).
19

PPG Indus. v. United States, 928 F.2d 1568, 1573 (Fed. Cir. 1991).

20

CUSFTA, supra note 3, Art. 2105, 27 I.L.M. at 399.

21

See Hart, supra note 6, at 336–37.

22
Charles M. Gastle & Jean-G. Castel, Should the North American Free Trade Agreement
Dispute Settlement Mechanism in Antidumping and Countervailing Duty Cases Be Reformed in
the Light of Softwood, 26 Law & Pol’y Int’l Bus. 823, 829 (1995).
23
Charles M. Gastle, Policy Alternatives for Reform of the Free Trade Agreement of the Americas: Dispute Settlement Mechanisms, 26 Law & Pol’y Int’l Bus. 735, 743 (1995) (explaining that
Chapter 19 was a “last-minute compromise that [had] saved the free trade negotiations”).
24
See Senate Committee on Finance, Report of the Committee on Finance, in Approving and
Implementing the United States-Canada Free-Trade Agreement: Reports and Other Materials,
S. Rep. No. 100-509, at 3, 8 (1988).
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export market, ranking only behind Japan.25 To Canada, improved access to
the largest consumer market in the world—combined with the increase in
U.S. and other foreign direct investment that normally follows the creation
of a free trade area—provided a number of benefits, including the long-term
permanence in Canada of Canadian and foreign-owned multinational corporations (MNCs).26 From a U.S. perspective, the FTA would, among other
things, ensure an open investment environment in Canada for U.S. companies, and facilitate U.S. access to vast Canadian energy resources.27 Chapter
19 was later extended to Mexico when it entered into the NAFTA in 1994.28
To implement a more closely integrated dispute settlement regime for
trade remedy investigations in the NAFTA area, members agreed to waive
their sovereign right to have their agency determinations be reviewed by
their domestic courts, opting instead for review by binational panels.29
Agency compliance with its country’s domestic trade remedy laws, as determined by these binational panels, would be the measure of that country’s
compliance with its NAFTA obligations.30 Thus, parties from NAFTA countries affected by U.S. trade remedy determinations were given the option to
seek either U.S. judicial or Chapter 19 panel review.31 However, a request for
the formation of a binational panel by any party who took part in the agency
proceedings forecloses U.S. court review of such determinations.32

25

Id.

26

See, e.g., Ralph H. Folson et al., Nafta—A Problem Oriented Coursebook 6 (2000) (noting
that “the majority of exports from MNCs in Canada are intra-firm exchanges,” and explaining
how this fact influenced MNC decisions to maintain operations in Canada despite the removal
of tariff barriers).
27
See The Constitutionality of Establishing a Binational Panel to Resolve Disputes in Antidumping and Countervailing Duty Cases: Hearing on United States-Canada Free Trade Agreement
Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 100th Cong. 2 (1988) (Statement of Ambassador Alan F.
Homer, Deputy U.S. Trade Representative).
28

NAFTA, supra note 2, Art. 2203, 32 I.L.M. at 702. For convenience, this article will refer to
NAFTA rather than the CUSFTA unless there is a particular need to distinguish the two.
29

NAFTA, supra note 2, Art. 1904(1), 32 I.L.M. at 683.

30

NAFTA, supra note 2, Art. 1904(2), 32 I.L.M. at 683.

31

See 19 U.S.C. § 1516a(a)(2); NAFTA, supra note 2, Art. 1904(5), 32 I.L.M. at 683.

32

19 U.S.C. § 1516a(g)(2); NAFTA, supra note 2, Art. 1904(11), 32 I.L.M. at 683.
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Panels, which consist of “experts” in international trade matters
(usually lawyers in private practice), are bound to apply the domestic law of
the party whose agency order is challenged, that is, the law of the importing
country.33 More importantly, as reviewing authorities, NAFTA panels must
apply “the standard of review . . . and the general legal principles that a court
of the importing party otherwise would apply to” determinations of the
competent agencies in the importing country.34 Therefore, NAFTA panels
reviewing Commerce or ITC trade remedy decisions are bound to (1) apply
U.S. trade remedy law; and (2) employ the statutorily mandated standard of
review and assume a level of deference similar to that extended to such
agencies by the CIT and the CAFC.35
In contrast to the U.S. judicial review system where the U.S. federal
courts of appeal have no discretion to refuse appeals of final determinations
from lower courts,36 there is no appeal as a matter of right from a panel
decision. Under NAFTA, only governments can file a request for an “extraordinary challenge” to a panel decision.37 Extraordinary Challenge Committees (ECCs) exist partly to ensure that NAFTA decisions remain consistent
with domestic law and precedent,38 but are permitted only in relatively
extreme circumstances. For example, a government can file an extraordinary challenge if a panelist is guilty of “gross misconduct,” or the panel
“manifestly exceeded its powers, authority or jurisdiction . . . for example by
failing to apply the appropriate standard of review,” but even then only if

33

Id.; NAFTA, supra note 2, Annex 1901.2(1)–(2), 32 I.L.M. at 687.

34

NAFTA, supra note 2, Art. 1904(3), 32 I.L.M. at 683.

35

Id.; accord GAO Report, supra note 7, at 35.

36

See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1291, 1295.

37

NAFTA, supra note 2, Art. 1904(13), 32 I.L.M. at 683.

38
Pure Magnesium from Canada, No. ECC-2003-1904-01USA, at ¶ 29 (Oct. 7, 2004) (ECC
should not permit “formation of two streams of anti-dumping and countervail duty law, one
developed by binational panels and one by courts; a result that is clearly antithetical to the whole
construct of Chapter 19”). Cf. Synthetic Baler Twine with a Knot Strength of 200 Lbs. or Less
Originating in or Exported from the United States of America, No. CDA-94-1904-02, at 12 (Apr.
10, 1995) (binational panel should use same standard of review as Canadian federal court, even
though binational panels are particularly expert in international law, to ensure “certainty,
consistency, and predictability in decision-making” between decisions involving NAFTA and
non-NAFTA members).
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such an action “materially affected the panel’s decision and threatens the
integrity of the binational panel review process.”39

IV. Earlier Studies on the Record of
Chapter 19 Review
Many authors have in some way sought to compare the results of Chapter 19
review of U.S. agency decisions with the outcomes of adjudication by the CIT
and CAFC.40 They all have noted that Chapter 19 panels overturn agency
decisions more often than the U.S. courts.41 Most consider this a desirable
outcome or at least one permissible under U.S. law.42 Some studies have also
compared how Chapter 19 panels review U.S. and Canadian agency decisions. They have concluded that Chapter 19 panels have showed far more
deference to Canadian decisions, and have ruled more often in favor of
petitioners from Canada.43 None of these studies, however, has systematically
looked at the outcomes of all Chapter 19 decisions during both CUSFTA and
NAFTA periods. They relied either on data available from the CUSFTA
39

NAFTA, supra note 2, Art. 1904(13), 32 I.L.M. at 683.

40
See Patrick Macrory, NAFTA Chapter 19: A Successful Experiment in International Trade
Dispute Resolution, C.D. Howe Inst. Comment. Sept. 2002, at 1; Jennifer Danner Riccardi, The
Failure of Chapter 19 in Design and Practice: An Opportunity for Reform, 28 Ohio N.U.L. Rev.
727 (2002); Kent Jones, Does NAFTA Chapter 19 Make a Difference? Dispute Settlement and
the Incentive Structure of U.S./Canada Unfair Trade Petitions, Contemp. Econ. Pol’y, Apr.,
2000, at 145; Eric J. Pan, Assessing the NAFTA Chapter 19 Binational Panel System: An
Experiment in International Adjudication, 40 Harv. Int’l L.J. 379 (1999); Judith Goldstein,
International Law and Domestic Institutions: Reconciling North American “Unfair” Trade Laws,
50 Int’l Org. 541 (1996); John M. Mercury, Chapter 19 of the United States-Canada Free Trade
Agreement 1989–95: A Check on Administered Protection? 15 NW J. Int’l L. & Bus. 525 (1995);
GAO Report, supra note 7, at 2; James R. Cannon, Jr., Resolving Disputes Under NAFTA
Chapter 19 chs. 13–14 (1994); Michael Krauss, The Record of the United States-Canada Binational Dispute Resolution Panels, N.Y. Int’l L. Rev. 85 (Summer, 1993); Andreas F. Lowenfeld,
Binational Dispute Settlement Under Chapter 19 of the Canada-United States Free Trade
Agreement: An Interim Appraisal, 24 N.Y.U. J. Int’l L. & Pol. 269 (1991).
41

Id.

42
See Macrory, supra note 40, at 18; Jones, supra note 40, at 149; Pan, supra note 40, at 442–44;
Goldstein, supra note 40, at 562; Mercury, supra note 40, at 527–28; Lowenfeld, supra note 40,
at 338.
43

See, e.g., Mercury, supra note 40, at 529–35, 568–72; Jones, supra note 40, at 149.
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period or data from the earlier years of NAFTA. More importantly, no prior
study has compared the results of Chapter 19 review with outcomes of U.S.
judicial review.

V. Empirical Analysis of Federal Judicial and
NAFTA Review of U.S. Agency Determinations
on Trade Remedy Cases from 1989 to 2005
A. Statement of Hypotheses and Some Methodological Considerations
To empirically verify whether the agreed-upon review mechanism of NAFTA
has behaved similarly to the CIT/CAFC review system, I looked at quantifiable aspects of decisions by these parallel adjudicatory systems. To confirm
or refute the general impression that NAFTA panels have been less deferential to U.S. agency decisions than U.S. courts, I examined AD/CVD rate,
scope, and injury decisions before and after review.44 The goal was to test the
following two hypotheses.45
H1: NAFTA panel review is less likely to leave rate determinations unchanged than U.S.
federal court review.
H2: NAFTA panel review is less likely to result in rate increases than U.S. federal court
review.

The foremost purpose of these hypotheses is twofold: (1) to allow us to
look at agency deference from a neutral, nonsubjective perspective; and (2)
to monitor the impact of NAFTA or judicial review on these agencies’
original determinations. In applying U.S. trade remedy statutory law, Commerce and the ITC issue determinations that either establish or deny the
imposition of AD/CVD remedies to imports deemed to be within the scope
of their investigations. From both legal and economic perspectives, these

44

To simplify sentences and facilitate the flow of text in this section, when I use the term
“rate(s),” the reader should understand that I may also be referring to decisions about the scope
of an order. For substantive, not textual, reasons explained in the text below, injury determinations are also subsumed under the general label “rates.”
45
Technically, “[t]he hypothesis that is actually tested is . . . the null hypothesis,” which generally
states that “there is no difference between [the two] groups [studied] or relationship between
the variables . . ..” Hubert M. Blalock, Jr., Social Statistics 156 (McGraw Hill, rev. 2d ed. 1979).
Accordingly, in this study, the “null” states that there is no difference between the two review
systems under any of these research hypotheses.
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decisions about duty rates or scope (Commerce) and injury (ITC) constitute
the core of these agencies’ determinations. Examining what happens to the
quantifiable dimensions of such decisions once judicial or NAFTA review is
completed allows us not only to test empirically whether these two systems
have approached agency decisions similarly, but also permits assessment of
the overall impact of judicial or NAFTA review on these decisions.
To accomplish these goals, the first hypothesis tests specifically whether
original AD/CVD rate determinations by U.S. agencies have the same
“success” rate under the two review systems. By looking at whether the final
results of either type of review maintain or alter the original agency
decision—by reference to what happens to the rate after all review is
completed—one can develop a picture of how often agency findings
(whether affirmative or negative) receive deference. For our purposes, an
agency “win” is either an outright affirmance by the CIT or NAFTA panel or
an affirmance of a determination on remand that leaves the original rate
undisturbed. Conversely, a “loss” occurs whenever the rate changes as a
result of review. Assuming ceteris paribus conditions, if one detects statistically significant differences in the way the two adjudicatory systems approach
agency decisions under review, one can then identify one of these two
systems as being systematically less deferential than the other.
Looking at a subset of these cases, the data collected under the second
hypothesis help us determine what happens to rates when an agency is
reversed. This hypothesis notably excludes cases where agencies have “won,”
as explained in the first hypothesis. By examining how rates change as a
result of review, we attempt to detect whether a particular statistically significant trend in the direction of rates exists. Specifically, when we exclude cases
where rates remain the same after review, do these adjudicatory systems
differ in terms of trends in postreview rates in such a way that one tends to
reduce or increase rates more than the other? If one of these review systems
is more likely to reduce agency-determined AD/CVD rates than the other,
then we can consider that particular system to be more beneficial to exporting interests than to the competing domestic industry in the importing
country. Thus, by determining that one review system is more likely to
increase (or decrease) rates than the other, we should be able to identify
which set of economic interests tends to benefit more under each system—
an inquiry beyond the notion of deference, tested in the first hypothesis.
In sum, should empirical analysis support these two hypotheses, we
would be justified in concluding that binational review under NAFTA has
failed to comply with the requirement that it apply the U.S. substantive law
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under the same principles of administrative review that prevail in U.S. courts.
Such sustained pattern of adjudication that limits the operation of U.S. trade
remedy statutes would amount to a failure to comply with Congress’s will and
the basic terms of the bargain to which NAFTA members agreed.
B. The Data
To test the two hypotheses, I collected data covering completed results of
CIT/CAFC review and NAFTA binational review in the period from January
1, 1989 to December 31, 2005. These results focused on determinations
made by the Department of Commerce and the ITC. For CIT/CAFC review,
the two main sources of primary data were (1) the U.S. Court of International Trade Reports (1989–1999);46 and (2) the websites of the CIT (1999–
2005),47 CAFC, and Georgetown Law Library (1995–2005), which contain all
decisions by these courts during the relevant period.48 Of all CIT/CAFC
opinions, I looked only at trade remedy cases, discarding other types of
litigation, such as appeals of Customs decisions to the CIT/CAFC and
appeals of government contracts, patents, trademarks, and certain money
claims against the U.S. government to the CAFC. I also examined the effects
of CAFC reversal of CIT decisions. As I looked at each of these decisions,
I monitored subsequent developments on remand by looking at agency
remand redeterminations according to the case file number assigned at the
CIT.
Because the CIT issues on average more than 120 decisions regarding
trade remedy determinations every year, I developed an algorithm that
restricted the size of the sample to manageable proportions while assuring
randomness. This algorithm is based on the last five digits of the case file
number assigned at random to all CIT decisions. If the sum of these digits
divided by three yields an integer, the case enters the sample. However, if
the selected case involves procedural issues (e.g., requests for injunctions,
mandamus, motions for rehearing, etc.) not relevant for comparison with
46
United States Court of International Trade Reports: Cases Adjudged in the United States
Court of International Trade, vols. 13–23 (1989–1999).
47

Court of International Trade website, http://www.cit.uscourts.gov/slip_op/slip-op.html (last
visited Nov. 10, 2006).
48
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit website, http://www.fedcir.gov/dailylog.html (last
visited Nov. 10, 2006); Georgetown Law Library website, available at 〈http://www.ll.georgetown.
edu/federal/judicial/cafed.cfm〉 (last visited Nov. 10, 2006).
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NAFTA dispute settlement, that selected case, though part of the sample, will
not appear in the total number of observations.
I obtained the initial agency rate from the Federal Register notice communicating the results of the agency’s final determination or from the
court’s opinion. To obtain information about what happened to rates when
the CIT did not affirm, I searched through the Federal Register database for
information about agencies’ redeterminations on remand.49 When I did not
succeed in obtaining any information through this means, I contacted the
Office of the Clerk of the CIT and requested information about these
particular remands. This was particularly necessary for remand redeterminations issued between January 1, 1989 and May 16, 1997, because the
Department of Commerce has not published its remand results for this
period and in some cases may not retain them. Remand redeterminations
for the relevant cases in the remaining period of our sample were obtained
from Commerce’s website.50 However, because information about some of
these cases was proprietary, I was not granted access to such remands and
could not reach a decision with respect to rates for such cases, and thus had
to eliminate them from the sample.
Because only 42 completed Chapter 19 cases reviewing U.S. agency
determinations occurred during the research period, I was able to collect
data on the entire population of published cases before NAFTA panels.
Primary data on these Chapter 19 cases were obtained from the NAFTA
Secretariat’s database of panel and ECC decisions.51 I also monitored subsequent developments on remand by looking at agency remand redeterminations to determine how prior rate decisions were affected. Information about
pre- and post-NAFTA review agency rates was collected from Federal Register
notices and the text of NAFTA panel or ECC reports following remand.
Upon completion of data collection, I coded each case for purposes of
hypothesis testing. Although detailed information about how cases were
coded is presented in the section below, my final decision with respect to
where a particular case fits is based on the final outcome of review once all
remand activity, if any, was approved by the reviewing body.
49
Federal Register Database, http://www.gpoaccess.gov/fr/index.html (last visited Nov. 10,
2006).
50

51

See ITA website, http://ia.ita.doc.gov/remands/ (last visited on Nov. 10, 2006).

NAFTA Secretariat’s Database, http://www.nafta-secalena.org/DefaultSite/index_e.aspx?
DetailID=76 (last visited on Nov. 10, 2006).
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To include ITC cases within the sample, I developed a method that
allowed me to convert review results from injury determinations into a
rate-based approach. Because of the binary nature of injury determinations
in U.S. trade remedy law, final judicial or NAFTA review of affirmative injury
determinations can result in either affirmance or revocation of the underlying AD/CVD duty order.52 Therefore, an affirmance of an affirmative injury
determination was coded as a decision that does not alter the rate, while a
final decision vacating or calling for the revocation of a prior affirmative
injury determination on remand means that the rate is in effect reduced
(i.e., the rate actually disappears) as a result of the order being revoked.
Accordingly, final affirmance of a negative injury determination was interpreted as a decision that leaves the rate unchanged (i.e., the rate remains at
zero as no order imposing offsetting duties exists), while a court or panelmandated remand that subsequently results in the ITC issuance of an affirmative injury remand redetermination does count as a change in rates, since
duty rates will necessarily be imposed, and rates will change from zero
upward.
C. Statistical Comparison of Chapter 19 and U.S. Judicial Review Outcomes
1. First Hypothesis: NAFTA Panel Review is Less Likely to Leave Rate
Determinations Unchanged than U.S. Federal Court Review
To test this hypothesis, I looked at whether the rates prevailing after the
conclusion of all review remained the same or changed (upward or downward) in comparison with the rates reported at the conclusion of U.S. agency
trade remedy investigations.53 Among the 168 cases in U.S. courts in the
sample, 68 percent (114 cases) resulted in no change in the agencydetermined rate after review, while 32 percent (54 cases) resulted in a
different rate. In contrast, among the 41 cases reviewed at NAFTA, 34
percent (14 cases) did not change the rate imposed by the agency. Signifi-

52

19 U.S.C. §§ 1671(a), 1673.

53
That is, rates established in Commerce’s original final determinations constitute the baseline
for rate comparisons throughout this study. For a number of reasons, not all relevant cases were
included in the reported number of observations. An otherwise relevant case was excluded
where either (1) the final disposition on review did not occur before December 31, 2005; (2) the
information regarding rates after remand was not available, as explained in Section IV.B; or (3)
the final disposition of a case, though occurring at a later year, was recorded earlier (to avoid the
risk of double-counting).
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cantly, NAFTA changed original agency rates 66 percent (27 cases) of the
time. Thus, in rounded figures, over two challenges in three fail to succeed
in changing U.S. agency rate decisions in U.S. courts. Yet, only one challenge
in three at NAFTA fails to change rates. Conversely, U.S. judicial review of
agency determinations change rates less than one-third of the time, while
review at NAFTA does so just short of two-thirds of the time.54 These results
demonstrate that varying the review system impacts the likelihood that rates
will remain the same. To be precise, U.S. judicial review is more deferential
to prior agency determinations than NAFTA binational review because it
allows the status quo to stand much more frequently.
To determine whether a statistically significant relationship exists
between adjudicating system and rate status, I performed a Fisher’s
exact test. I obtained a p value less than 0.001 (two-tailed), and was able to
corroborate the hypothesis that NAFTA panel review is less likely to leave
rate determinations unchanged than U.S. federal court review. That the
source of review affects whether rates change suggests that U.S. judicial
review is more deferential to agency determinations than NAFTA as a result
of the principle of judicial deference prevailing in all administrative litigation in U.S. courts.
2. Second Hypothesis: NAFTA Panel Review is Less Likely to Result in Rate
Increases than U.S. Federal Court Review
By examining the subset of decisions where U.S. agencies were reversed, one
seeks to determine if the two review systems also differ with respect to the
direction that revised rates assume after review is completed.55 This examination reveals that although both review systems are more likely to decrease
than increase rates when they reverse agencies, they differ markedly in terms
of how often rates are increased or decreased. When U.S. courts reverse U.S.
agencies, their review leads to increased rates about 32 percent (14 of 44
cases) of the time or almost three times for every 10 reversals. NAFTA, on the
other hand, does so 8 percent (2 of 25 cases) of the time, or less than once

54
See the Appendix for a list of the cases in which NAFTA review changed rates. Due to the large
sample size, I do not provide a list of the CIT/CAFC cases that resulted in changed rates.
55

As with the first hypothesis, not all relevant cases were included in the reported number of
observations. In addition to the reasons for exclusion listed in note 53, an otherwise relevant
case was excluded where either (1) the rates did not differ from the original rates; or (2) the
rates assessed to particular companies changed in opposite directions (“mixed-rate” cases).
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for every 10 reversals. In relative percentages, NAFTA review is thus four
times less likely to result in increased rates than U.S. court review. Conversely, after NAFTA review, rates are decreased 92 percent of the time (23
out of 25 cases) compared to only 68 percent of the time (30 of 44 cases) in
U.S. federal courts.56
Statistical testing (p value approximately 0.036, two-tailed) confirmed
the interpretation above, allowing me to corroborate the hypothesis that
NAFTA panel review is less likely to result in rate increases than U.S. federal
court review. That NAFTA review is more likely to result in rate decreases
than U.S. judicial review supports the earlier inference that NAFTA is more
beneficial to exporting interests than to the competing U.S. domestic industry seeking relief against foreign trade practices.
One should note that of the 14 CIT/CAFC reviews that resulted in rate
increases, nine were filed by plaintiffs representing the domestic industry.57
To date, such plaintiffs have never initiated a Chapter 19 proceeding
(though they have cross-appealed in reaction to importers’ appeals). In
theory, one could suppose that the difference in outcomes between Chapter
19 and CIT adjudication arises because U.S. industries have neglected to file
appeals that would have succeeded if they had bothered to pursue them. But
it is hard to imagine why U.S. industries would be relatively more neglectful
of their own rights in cases with Chapter 19 jurisdiction than in cases with
CIT jurisdiction. In both forums it is relatively cheap to appeal, compared
with pursuing an investigation, so that if the expense of filing a petition
justified pursuing a matter, the chance of filing an appeal with a good chance
of success would seem equally to justify doing so. Thus, the reluctance on the
part of U.S. domestic industry to request Chapter 19 review likely results
from the perception that its chances of success are low. This perception may
be based on commentators who have observed different success rates58 and
the history of Chapter 19, which was introduced as a result of Canadian
complaints that the CIT did not give Canadian parties a sufficient chance of
success.

56

See the Appendix for a list of cases where NAFTA review has decreased rates.

57

See the Appendix for a list of CIT/CAFC cases filed by the domestic industry.

58

Supra note 40.
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D. Why a Priest-Klein Case Selection Effect Cannot Account for the Results of
Chapter 19 Litigation
Priest and Klein posited that samples consisting only of litigated cases are
not necessarily representative of the larger population of disputes about
which one draws causal inferences.59 In light of this, one may question
whether a case selection effect might actually account for the demonstrated
propensity of Chapter 19 panels to rule against U.S. agency decisions. If
fewer challenges to NAFTA mean only stronger cases are being pursued,
the difference in reversal rates between the two systems may be a result of
case selection, rather than an indication of less deference in the Chapter 19
system.
Two important facts refute this conjecture. First, from 1989 through
2003 (the most recent year for which statistics on agency orders are available), the United States issued 15 AD/CVD orders on Canadian imports,60 all
of which were appealed to Chapter 19 panels.61 That Canadian parties chose
to challenge every order a U.S. agency issued against their exports shows how
unselective they have been with respect to their decisions to appeal. In
contrast, since New Steel Rails from Canada in 1990,62 U.S. industry has not
bothered to appeal any negative dumping, subsidy, or injury decision by U.S.
agencies regarding Canadian goods, even though appeals typically require

59
For a detailed discussion of this model, see George Priest & Benjamin Klein, The Selection of
Disputes for Litigation, 13 J. Legal Stud. 1 (1984).
60

See International Trade Administration, U.S. Department of Commerce, Antidumping Investigations Case Activity (Jan. 1, 1980–Dec. 31, 2003), available at 〈http://ia.ita.doc.gov/stats/
ad-1980-2003.html〉 (last visited Nov. 10, 2006); International Trade Administration, U.S.
Department of Commerce, Antidumping Investigations Case Activity (Jan. 1, 1980–Dec. 31,
2003), available at 〈http://ia.ita.doc.gov/stat/cvd-1980-2003.html〉 (last visited Nov. 10, 2006);
International Trade Administration, U.S. Department of Commerce, AD/CVD Investigations
Federal Register History, available at 〈http://ia.ita.doc.gov/stats/caselist.txt〉 (last visited Nov.
10, 2006).
See NAFTA Secretariat, Decisions and Reports, available at 〈http://www.nafta-sec-alena.org/
DefaultSite/index_e.aspx?DetailID=76〉 (last visited Nov. 10, 2006).

61

62

New Steel Rail, Except Light Rail, from Canada, Panel No. USA-89-1904-08 (FTA Panel Aug.
13, 1990).
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much less effort than investigations.63 Second, a comparison of the ratio of
Canadian appeals to U.S. agency determinations before and after the creation
of the Chapter 19 system shows that the Canadian appeals increased with the
inception of Chapter 19 review. Canadian parties appealed 19.5 percent of
Commerce determinations to the CIT in the period between January 1985
and December 1988.64 In contrast, Canadians challenged 47 percent of such
determinations before Chapter 19 panels in the period from January 1989 to
September 1994.65 That Canadian appeals have become more frequent since
the creation of Chapter 19 review refutes the notion that these cases are
somehow made up of stronger claims.
A similar effect could arise if U.S. agencies discriminated against
Canadian imports by imposing a disproportionate number of AD/CVD
orders on Canadian products. The opposite is true. U.S. agencies have
imposed fewer duties on NAFTA members, and U.S. industries have filed
relatively fewer petitions regarding NAFTA members’ goods.66 In sum,
Chapter 19’s high rate of agency reversal in comparison with U.S. judicial
review cannot be explained by any kind of case selectivity effect.
E. Pre-Chapter 19 Litigation Results in Cases Involving Canadian Goods
A comparison between litigation patterns in challenges to U.S. agency determinations on Canadian goods before and after the creation of Chapter 19 is
necessary to ensure that attribution of the higher reversal rate in Chapter 19
review to the change in adjudicatory system is appropriate. In other words,
should Chapter 19 reversal rates match those of U.S. judicial review in the
years immediately preceding its creation, one would be forced to conclude
that Chapter 19 is not deciding Canadian cases differently than would the
U.S. courts it replaced. Further, arguments about changes in the degree of
deference could not be maintained, as no change would have occurred.

63

E.g., Live Swine from Canada, 70 Fed. Reg. 20,400 (Int’l Trade Comm’n Apr. 19, 2005) (final
injury determ.); Live Swine from Canada, 70 Fed. Reg. 12,186 (Dep’t of Commerce Mar. 11,
2005) (final countervailing duty determ.); Durum and Hard Red Wheat from Canada, 68 Fed.
Reg. 60,707 (Int’l Trade Comm’n Oct. 23, 2003) (final.injury determ.).
64

See GAO Report, supra note 7, at 41.

65

See GAO Report, supra note 7, at 41.

66

See Macrory, supra note 40; Jones, supra note 40.
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Thus, we must examine the rate of U.S. agency wins and losses during the
post-Chevron period that preceded the creation of Chapter 19 (1984–1988).
A perfect comparison between the data sets in the two periods is not
possible due to lack of information on the status of rates (pre- and postreview), but we can still roughly determine the extent to which U.S. agency
decisions were maintained (or changed) by analyzing published court opinions involving Canadian goods in the relevant period. A search of published
CIT decisions produced 26 slip opinions involving “nonprocedural” challenges to U.S. agency final determinations on Canadian products in the
1984–1988 period. These 26 decisions occurred on 17 separate cases brought
by U.S. domestic industry, U.S. importing industry, or Canadian producers.
Of these 17 cases, the U.S. government won 10 (58.82 percent), with
other parties winning 7 (41.18 percent). Although this analysis does not
reveal what happened to the rate after court review, it uses U.S. government
wins as a proxy for agency affirmance and, therefore, deference. I suspect
that if data on rates before and after review were available for this period,
some of these cases would result in rates being left ultimately unchanged,
since, as we learned from the other sample (1989–2005), not all court
reversals lead to rate decreases on remand. Regardless, this means that at
least 58 percent of cases resulted in no change in rates. In comparison with
the 34.15 percent U.S. agency win rate at NAFTA, this is quite a change.
Furthermore, we can now surmise that nonagency parties went from a less
than 42 percent win rate before NAFTA to a 66 percent win rate, which is a
significant increase. Thus, we can conclude that change in review systems
brought a greater agency reversal rate.
Of course, this analysis combines under the label “other parties”
Canadian and U.S. plaintiffs (U.S. domestic industry and U.S. importers).
Yet, except for a desire to reverse prior agency action, these parties have
opposing interests. Therefore, I analyzed these 17 cases according to
whether the party who won had a preference to maintain or increase duty
rates (U.S. government and U.S. domestic industry), or was attempting to
reduce or eliminate these rates altogether (Canadian producer and U.S.
importer). Bearing in mind that U.S. agencies won 10 of these cases, if one
takes note of the fact that among the seven wins for other parties, three wins
are for U.S. domestic industry, one can conclude that pro-rate parties won
(at least) 76.47 percent of these pre-NAFTA cases, much above the 23.53
percent win rate for anti-rate parties.
These changes in rates of agency reversal and duty rate reductions
show a systemic pattern: far from mirroring preexisting litigation patterns in

Alternate Methods of Appellate Review in Trade Remedy Cases

189

U.S. judicial review, the switch from CIT adjudication to Chapter 19 review
has profoundly altered the general profile of outcomes in favor of Canadian
producers and against U.S. agencies and U.S. domestic industry. More
importantly, they corroborate the notion that Chapter 19 panels have not
behaved like the U.S. courts they replaced.
F. Examining Alternative Causation Explanations
Conceivably, one could argue that the reported differences between the two
systems merely reflect a pro-U.S. agency bias in U.S. courts. Therefore,
NAFTA results are different because its panels are simply providing a more
“correct” interpretation of the law (though this would still mean that NAFTA
panels were not fulfilling their mandate to apply U.S. law in the same fashion
as the U.S. courts). However, there is reason to think otherwise.67 If this were
true, this conclusion would still have momentous implications. CIT judges
are highly qualified U.S. lawyers, who are appointed for life under strict
Article III requirements specifically to shield them from political influence.
They typically have many years’ experience on the bench, where they specialize in trade law. Their decisions are subject to appeal to the Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit, where judges have similar qualifications and experience. Thus, if this arrangement produces outcomes that are dramatically
more biased against foreign nationals than do ad hoc panels of part-time
judges of mixed legal backgrounds, often with no prior judicial or trade
experience or even law degrees, and no regular appellate review, then the
entire U.S. system of lifetime judicial appointment needs rethinking.
Additionally, a bias argument simplistically assumes that all U.S.
parties—including the agency, the petitioning domestic industry, and the
U.S. importers—have homogenous interests. The opposite is true. For
example, the domestic industry would want to impose or increase duties
while U.S. importers would want to eliminate or decrease them. In turn, the
agency has a greater interest in seeing its earlier decisions upheld on appeal
regardless of whether they authorized or denied the imposition of AD/CVD
duties. Even if domestic producers could control the appointment process to
“pack” the CIT with pro-duty judges (assuming U.S. importers do not form
as strong a lobby), it would be much more difficult to sustain that level of

67
See Juscelino F. Colares & John W. Bohn, NAFTA’s Double Standards of Review, 42 Wake
Forest L. Rev. 199, 228–33 (2007) (explaining why NAFTA panels would be less likely to adhere
to U.S. standard of review than U.S. courts).
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control over CAFC appointments. This is the case because review of trade law
decisions is a smaller part of the CAFC docket than review of other cases,
such as patent cases and claims against the U.S. government. Thus, judicial
appointments would be made based on considerations other than just the
candidate’s views regarding trade law.
More importantly, a bias argument simply cannot undermine the CIT/
CAFC’s alignment with other federal administrative review. If one takes the
data and statistical analysis coming from the CIT/CAFC portion of this study
and compares them with the results of general appellate review of agency
action in the United States, no discrepancy appears. As Graves and Teske
showed, when considering a period that predated Chevron by several years,
federal appellate and Supreme Court review of administrative decisions
yielded affirmance rates of up to 63 percent, which is not much different
from the 68 percent affirmance rate detected in the first hypothesis.68 If
affirmance rates of this magnitude are the norm for agency review proceedings throughout the federal judiciary, one can only conclude that the
NAFTA binational review system is not acting like reviewing courts in the
United States.
Equally, it is possible that some unknown factual distinction accounts
for the difference in outcomes. That is, there could be some unique factor
that distinguishes appeals involving Canada from appeals involving other
countries. Many papers have used statistical analysis to try to identify factors
that influence the outcomes of agency determinations of dumping, subsidization, or injury.69 For example, many have considered whether factors that

68
See Scott Graves & Paul Teske, State Supreme Courts and Judicial Review of Regulation, 66
Alb. L. Rev. 857, 859–60 (2003).
69

E.g., Michael O. Moore, An Econometric Analysis of U.S. Antidumping Sunset Review Decisions, 142 Rev. World Econ. 122 (2006); Bruce A. Blonigen, Evolving Discretionary Practices of
U.S. Antidumping Activity, NBER Working Paper 9625 (Apr. 2003); Bruce A. Blonigen & Chad
P. Brown, Antidumping and Retaliation Threats, 60 J. Int’l Econ. 249 (2003); Kyung-Ho Lee &
Jai S. Mah, Institutional Changes and Antidumping Decisions in the United States, 25 J. Pol.
Modeling 555 (2003); James M. De Vault, Congressional Dominance and the International
Trade Commission, 110 Public Choice 1 (2002); Wendy L. Hansen & Thomas J. Prusa, The
Economics and Politics of Trade Policy: An Empirical Analysis of ITC Decision Making, 5 Rev.
Int’l Econ. 230 (1997); Keith B. Anderson, Agency Discretion or Statutory Direction: Decision
Making at the U.S. International Trade Commission, 36 J. L. & Econ. 915 (1993); Stefanie A.
Lenway et al., To Lobby or to Petition: The Political Environment of U.S. Trade Policy, 16 J.
Mgmt. 119 (1990); Judith Goldstein & Stefanie Ann Lenway, Interests of Institutions: An Inquiry
into Congressional-ITC Relations, 33 Int’l Studies Q. 303 (1989); J.M. Finger et al., The Political
Economy of Administered Protection, 72 Am. Econ. Rev. 452 (1982).
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are proxies for political influence correlate with outcomes at the ITC or
Commerce, generally with inconclusive or negative results.70 Analysis of
these discussions is interesting but falls outside the scope of this article.71
Unfortunately, no study has similarly tried to analyze factors explaining
the outcomes of judicial review of agency decisions in trade cases, which is
not the same thing. For example, Blonigen and Brown find that China tends
to receive higher anti-dumping margins from Commerce, and Korea,
Taiwan, and Russia to have significantly lower ones.72 But that does not
necessarily mean that judicial review is more—or less—likely to overturn
Commerce decisions involving China than Korea. These figures, in themselves, do not suggest that Commerce is “biased” against China or in favor of
Korea, or that judicial review would reverse those biases, or whether some
other factor entirely explains the observed differences in margins (e.g., that
the absence of reliable input price data in China’s imperfectly market-based
economy means that firms tend more frequently to sell below cost and hence
dump more frequently). Accordingly, while more research regarding factors
influencing court review of trade cases may be useful, there is no currently
known factor that would cause the outcome of trade appeals involving
Canada to differ from appeals involving other countries, other than different
application of standards of review.

VI. Conclusion
A striking feature of the data analyzed above is the sustained asymmetrical
pattern of review results between NAFTA and CIT/CAFC adjudication.

70

See Finger, supra note 69 (finding no significant evidence of political influence on Commerce
anti-dumping and countervailing duty decisions); Lenway, supra note 69 (finding no significant
evidence of political influence on ITC decisions); Hansen & Prusa, supra note 69 (finding that
ITC decisions positively correlated with PAC contributions and House Ways & Means Committee representation but non- or negatively correlated with Senate Finance Committee representation); De Vault, supra note 69, at 1, 18 (Congress has “influenced” ITC decisions but not
“micromanaged” them).
71

Faced with a potentially infinite number of possible correlations that might be analyzed
between potential explanatory variables and observed outcomes of trade cases, it is not necessarily surprising to find some statistically significant positive correlations. Interpretation of the
significance of these correlations requires caution.
72

See Blonigen, supra note 69.
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Looking in different ways at the agency-determined rates prevailing before
and after adjudication, U.S. agencies consistently “lose” on NAFTA appeals
at a greater rate than when those challenges are raised before U.S. courts.
Similar results would normally be interpreted as uncontroversial if they
emanated from parallel review systems where the substantive law or guiding
principles of administrative review (or both) were different. That is not the
case with review before NAFTA and the CIT/CAFC systems.
NAFTA’s lack of conformity with the pattern of adjudication in all U.S.
federal administrative review, including international trade, may mean more
than just a mere difference in approaching U.S. substantive law. It may
suggest that the NAFTA system is deficient not because it is necessarily
determined to misapply U.S. trade remedy law—though such may be the effect
of its decisions—but because it just “doesn’t get” U.S. administrative law. The
Honorable Malcolm Wilkey, a retired judge from the District of Columbia
Circuit, former U.S. ambassador, and former member of a NAFTA ECC,
diagnosed this problem long ago.
Why do these distinguished Panel experts make this type of error? The answer is,
I suggest, that they are experts in trade law; they are not experts in the field of
judicial review of agency action; they do not necessarily have any familiarity
whatsoever with the standards of judicial review under United States law.73

Both empirical analysis of the above hypotheses and the systemic-wide
findings of previous studies seem to support Judge Wilkey’s criticism. For
example, while declining to establish a causal pattern based on behavioral
differences between Chapter 19 panelists and U.S. judges as the reason why
their decisions differed, a prior GAO study found “significant differences
between the behavioral characteristics of the binational panel process and
the U.S. judicial system that it replaces.”74 Further, Judge Wilkey’s observation can perhaps help explain the marked increase in U.S. agency reversals
in cases involving Canadian goods between the years immediately preceding
and during Chapter 19 dispute settlement, during which U.S. law remained
largely the same. This remains more than a theoretical discussion, however.
The fact is that U.S. trade remedy law is being applied differently as a result
of this two-track system. That goes explicitly against the express will of

73

Certain Softwood Lumber Products from Canada, ECC No. 94-1904-01USA (Ex. Chal. Com.
Aug. 3, 1994).
74

GAO Report, supra note 7, at 4.
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congressional committees75 and should be the object of future reform.76
Subsequent research on Chapter 19 review of Canadian agency cases would
further our understanding of whether the same asymmetric pattern of adjudication extends beyond the application of U.S. trade remedy law.

Appendix
A1. NAFTA Review Has Changed Rates in the Following Cases
Hard Red Spring Wheat from Canada, Panel No. USA-CDA-2003-1904-06
(NAFTA Panel June 7, 2005) (final injury determ.)
Certain Duram Wheat and Hard Red Spring Wheat from Canada, Panel No.
USA-CDA-2003-1904-05 (NAFTA Panel Mar. 10, 2005) (final CVD
determ.)
Certain Softwood Lumber Products from Canada, Panel No. USA-CDA-20021904-07 (NAFTA Panel Sept. 5, 2003) (threat of injury determ.)
Pure Magnesium from Canada, Panel No. USA-CDA-2000-1904-06 (NAFTA
Panel Mar. 27, 2002) (AD sunset review)
Gray Portland Cement and Cement Clinker from Mexico, Panel No. USAMEX-99-1904-03 (NAFTA Panel May 30, 2002) (7th AD admin. rev.)
Pure Magnesium and Alloy Magnesium from Canada, Panel No. USA-CDA2000-1904-07 (NAFTA Panel Mar. 27, 2002) (CVD sunset review)
Corrosion-Resistant Carbon Steel Flat Products from Mexico, Panel No.
USA-CDA-98-1904-01 (NAFTA Panel Mar. 20, 2001) (3d AD admin.
rev.)
Brass Sheet and Strip from Canada, Panel No. USA-CDA-98-1904-03 (NAFTA
Panel July 16, 1999) (AD admin. rev.)
Gray Portland Cement and Clinker from Mexico, Panel No. USA-97-1904-01
(NAFTA Panel June 18, 1999) (5th AD admin. rev.)

75

See, e.g., Senate Committee on Finance, Report of the Committee on Finance in North
American Free Trade Agreement Implementation Act: Joint Report, S. Rep. 103-189, at 41–42
(1993) [hereinafter S. Joint Rep.] (explaining that the requirement that “binational panels
. . . apply the same standard of review and general legal principles that domestic courts” employ
“is the foundation of the binational panel system”); accord S. Comm. on the Judiciary, Report
of the Committee on the Judiciary in S. Joint Rep. at 126 (expressing the desire that the
inclusion of judges in the panel system “would diminish the possibility that panels and courts
will develop distinct bodies of U.S. law”).
76

See generally Riccardi, supra note 40, at 727–46.
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Porcelain-on-Steel Cookware from Mexico, Panel No. USA-97-1904-07
(NAFTA Panel Apr. 30, 1999)
Fresh Cut Flowers from Mexico, Panel No. USA-95-1904-05 (NAFTA Panel
Dec. 12, 1996) (final AD determ.)
Oil Country Tubular Goods from Mexico, Panel No. USA-95-1904-04
(NAFTA Panel July 31, 1996) (final AD determ.)
Porcelain-on-Steel Cookware from Mexico, Panel No. USA-95-1904-01
(NAFTA Panel Apr. 30, 1996) (5th AD admin. rev.)
Leather Wearing Apparel from Mexico, Panel No. USA-94-1904-02 (NAFTA
Panel Oct. 20, 1995) (final CVD determ.)
Live Swine from Canada, Panel No. USA-94-1904-01 (NAFTA Panel May 30,
1995) (6th AD admin rev.)
Certain Corrosion-Resistant Carbon Steel Flat Products from Canada, Panel
No. USA-93-1904-03 (FTA Panel Oct. 31, 1994) (final AD determ.)
Certain Cut-to-Length Carbon Steel Plate from Canada, Panel No. USA-931904-04 (FTA Panel Oct. 31, 1994) (final AD determ.)
Pure and Alloy Magnesium from Canada, Panel No. USA-92-1904-04 (FTA
Panel Oct. 6, 1993) (final AD determ.)
Certain Softwood Lumber Products from Canada, Panel No. USA-92-1904-02
(FTA Panel July 26, 1993) (final injury determ.)
Certain Softwood Lumber Products from Canada, Panel No. USA-92-1904-01
(FTA Panel May 6, 1993) (final CVD determ.)
Live Swine from Canada, Panel No. USA-91-1904-04 (FTA Panel Aug. 26,
1992) (5th CVD admin. rev.)
Live Swine from Canada, Panel No. USA-91-1904-03 (FTA Panel May 19,
1992) (4th CVD admin. rev.)
Replacement Parts for Self-Propelled Bituminous Paving Equipment from
Canada, Panel No. USA-90-1904-01 (FTA Panel May 24, 1991) (final
AD determ.)
Fresh, Chilled, and Frozen Pork from Canada, Panel No. USA-89-1904-06
(FTA Panel Sept. 28, 1990) (final CVD determ.)
Fresh, Chilled, and Frozen Pork from Canada, Panel No. USA-89-1904-11
(FTA Panel Aug. 24, 1990) (final injury determ.)
New Steel Rail, Except Light Rail, from Canada, Panel No. USA-89-1904-07
(FTA Panel June 30, 1990) (final CVD determ.)
Red Raspberries from Canada, Panel No. USA-89-1904-01 (FTA Panel Dec.
15, 1989) (final AD determ.)
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A2. NAFTA Review Has Decreased Rates in the Following Cases
Duram and Hard Red Spring Wheat (June 7, 2005)
Duram Wheat (Mar. 10, 2005)
Softwood Lumber (Sept. 5, 2003)
Pure Magnesium (Mar. 27, 2002)
Pure Magnesium and Alloy Magnesium (Mar. 27, 2002)
Gray Portland Cement and Cement Clinker (May 30, 2002)
Corrosion-Resistant Carbon Steel Flat Products (Mar. 20, 2001)
Brass Sheet and Strip (July 16, 1999)
Gray Portland Cement and Clinker (June 18, 1999)
Fresh Cut Flowers (Dec. 16, 1996)
Oil Country Tubular Goods (July 31, 1996)
Porcelain-on-Steel Cookware (Apr. 30, 1996)
Leather Wearing Apparel (Oct. 20, 1995)
Certain Cut-to-Length Carbon Steel Plate (Oct. 31, 1994)
Pure and Alloy Magnesium (Oct. 6, 1993)
Lumber (July 26, 1993)
Softwood Lumber (May 6, 1993)
Swine (Aug. 26, 1992)
Swine (May 19, 1992)
Fresh, Chilled, and Frozen Pork (Sept. 28, 1990)
New Steel Rail, Except Light Rail (June 8, 1990)
Fresh, Chilled, and Frozen Pork (Aug. 24, 1990)
Red Raspberries (Dec. 15, 1989)
A3. Domestic Industry Filed the Following Cases in the CIT/CAFC System
Maui Pineapple Co. v. United States Dep’t Commerce, 264 F. Supp. 2d 1244
(Ct. Int’l Trade 2003)
Al Tech Specialty Steel Corp. v. United States Dep’t Commerce, 25 C.I.T. 343
(2001)
Allegheny Ludlum Corp. v. United States Dep’t Commerce, 215 F. Supp. 2d
1322 (Ct. Int’l Trade 2000)
Inland Steel Indus., Inc. v. United States Dep’t Commerce, 967 F. Supp. 1338
(Ct. Int’l Trade 1997)
Torrington Co. v. United States Dep’t Commerce, 973 F. Supp. 164 (Ct. Int’l
Trade 1997)
NACCO Materials Handling Group, Inc. v. United States Dep’t Commerce,
896 F. Supp. 1248 (Ct. Int’l Trade 1995)
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NTN Bearing Corp. of Am. v. United States Dep’t of Commerce, 858 F. Supp.
215 (Ct. of Int’l Trade 1994)
Smith Corona Corp. v. United States Dep’t of Commerce, 796 F. Supp. 1532
(Ct. Int’l Trade 1992)
Timken Co. v. United States Dep’t Commerce, 714 F. Supp. 535 (Ct. Int’l
Trade 1989)

